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Abstract We study the relationship between economic distortions and the size dis-
tribution of plants using comparable plant-level data across 104 developing countries.
Our main result is to show that, other things equal, countries with larger economic
distortions allocate more labor to small unproductive units. By decomposing the busi-
ness environment into different type of distortions, we find that poor access to financial
credit is the one driving our results. We also show that there exists a significant cross-
country relationship between the size distribution and aggregate productivity. These
results are consistent with a large recent literature on misallocation of resources across
firms.
Keywords TFP · Plant size distribution · Economic distortions
JEL Classification L11 · L53 · O47
We thank Samuel Bentolila, Nezih Guner, Claudio Michelacci, Jan De Loecker, Josep Pijoan-Mas,
Markus Posckhe, at least two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at CEMFI, SAEe 2012 in
Vigo, and the Barcelona Summer Forum for valuable comments and useful discussions. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Bank
of Spain or the Eurosystem. Roberto gratefully acknowledges financial support of the Spanish Ministry of







1 Jaume I building, 20 Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
2 Bank of Spain, Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain
123
280 SERIEs (2015) 6:279–312
1 Introduction
Why do some countries have so low levels of income per capita? Why, for instance,
income per capita in Nepal is only 2.5% that of the United States? A common view
is that a high proportion of income variation across countries can be attributed to
differences in total factor productivity (TFP).1 Moreover, a recent strand of literature
has started to emphasize misallocation of resources across plants as a source of these
differences in aggregate productivity.2 This literature emphasizes that the existence of
distortions favoring small low productivity firms and hindering large high productivity
firms makes the economy deviate from its first best. Any distortion that leads to too
many resources being allocated to relatively small unproductive firmsmakes aggregate
productivity fall. As a result, the size distribution of firms becomes a crucial object in
understanding the aggregate productivity of a country.
Although these recent works on misallocation have provided valuable insights on
the impact of distortions on how resources are allocated across firms, our understand-
ing of the underlying factors driving the variation across countries in the firm size
distribution remains somehow limited. In this paper, we empirically investigate the
cross-country relationship between the amount of labor allocated to small plants and
a number of economic distortions using plant-level data: the Enterprise Surveys of the
World Bank 2006–2010 (ESWB). This dataset has three main advantages. First, it is
standardized. This means that every plant in every country answers the same ques-
tions, allowing for comparability across countries. Second, coverage is very broad
(more than 100 countries), which gives us power to validate the statistical significance
of our findings. And third, the sample of surveyed plants is representative of the popu-
lation of formal private non-agricultural plants. This allows us to establish some facts
about the allocation of resources beyond manufacturing.
Figure 1 shows that there exists substantial variation across countries in the share of
labor allocated to small plants. Tomotivate our analysis,wefirst show that there exists a
strong relationship between the size distribution and productivity at the aggregate level:
countries with a higher amount of labor allocated to small plants have lower levels of
income perworker andTFP.We then show that high economic distortions, asmeasured
by theDoing Business Index, are systematically associated to a higher amount of labor
allocated to small plants. This is so after conditioning for other determinants of the
size distribution, such as the size of the informal sector, amount of FDI, and presence
of export firms. We address endogeneity concerns by instrumenting the economic
distortions with variables argued in the literature to provide exogenous variation in
institutions. We also explore the different components of the business environment
driving the previous result. We decompose the Doing Business Index into measures of
access to credit, tax rates, costs of entry, rule of law, trading easiness, and corruption.
We find that, when we include all these components together, access to credit is the
one driving our results.
1 See, for instance, Caselli (2005), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999).
2 Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Guner et al. (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) are some examples.
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Fig. 1 Share of labor accounted by small plants. The share of employment accounted by plants of less
than 20 employees, computed from the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank (2006–2010). The cutoffs
are obtained by classifying the sample in three groups of the same size
From a theoretical point of view, the sign of the relationship between TFP and the
share of employment accounted for by small plants is ambiguous, since it depends
on the type of model and the nature of the distortions studied. This comes from
the fact that the amount of misallocation and its relationship with the prevalence of
small plants is also model specific. However, in the type of models and distortions
that have been analyzed in the recent misallocation literature, this latter relationship
is generally positive, implying a negative association between TFP and the amount
of resources allocated to small plants. This is the case, for instance, in models of
occupational choice à la Lucas (1978) under the presence of distortions that impose
restrictions on firms’ size, see for instance Guner et al. (2008) and García-Santana
and Pijoan-Mas (2014). This is also the case in the model used by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) when firms’ idiosyncratic taxes are positively correlated to productivity. In
their model, this positive correlation implies that more productive firms are inef-
ficiently small, whereas small unproductive firms are inefficiently large. This has
actually been found to be the case when carrying out the Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
exercise for a large set of developing countries, see Busso et al. (2013). Finally,
Bartelsman et al. (2013) find substantial cross-country variation in the covariance
between size and productivity. In particular, they find that this covariance is gener-
ally lower in poor countries. This suggests that the higher presence of distortions in
low-income countries biases the size distribution of plants towards small unproductive
units.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related lit-
erature and places the paper within it. Section 3 explains in detail the characteristics
of our dataset. Section 4 illustrates the relationship between size and productivity at
the aggregate level. Section 5 shows that economic distortions significantly explain
part of the cross-country variation in the amount of labor allocated to small plants.
Section 6 analyzes the role of particular distortions. Finally, Sect. 7 gives concluding
remarks.
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2 Related literature
Our paper is related to some old works that study the size distribution of plants in
developing countries. Banarji (1978) shows for a small number of countries that the
average size of plants is positively correlated with physical capital intensity. Liedholm
and Donald (1987) provide evidence of poor countries havingmost of the employment
allocated to small and large plants, establishing a phenomenon known as “the missing
middle”. In a classic paper, Tybout (2000) collects this evidence and relates it to the
poor performance of the manufacturing sector in developing countries. Leaning on
country-level studies, he argues that a strong business regulation can be behind the
excessive presence of small entrepreneurs. By remaining small, entrepreneurs are able
to avoid government regulation and hence do not achieve a larger size.3 However, in
a recent work, Hsieh and Olken (2014) find evidence that suggest that large firms are
actually the ones most affected by regulation.
Our paper also contributes to a more recent literature that investigate in a systematic
way the cross-country variation in the size distribution of firms. Alfaro et al. (2009)
use establishment-level data for 79 countries to calibrate a closed economy version of
Melitz (2003), which they use to infer the level of distortions necessary to generate the
observed deviation in the size distribution of establishments with respect to the US.
Our exercise is different, since we take direct measures of distortions from the data
rather than inferring them, and look at their relationship with the size distribution of
firms. Poschke (2014) uses theGlobal EntrepreneurshipMonitor (GEM) andAmadeus
dataset for around 50 countries to document that the average, standard deviation, and
skewness of the size distribution of firms are positively correlated to income per capita.
His empirical findings are consistent with ours, since he shows a strong cross-country
negative relationship between income and the importance of small production units
in the economy. He then constructs a model of occupational choice with skill-biased
change in entrepreneurial technology that can account for this facts. Busso et al. (2013)
apply theHsieh andKlenow (2009)methodology to 10LatinAmerican countries using
establishment-level data produced by the countries’ statistical offices. They find that
dispersion in the marginal products of capital and labor account for the low measured
productivity in the manufacturing sector of these countries. Finally, in a very recent
work, Bento and Restuccia (2015) construct a new dataset containing information of
the size distribution of establishments in 134 countries. They find a clear relationship
between income per capita and the prevalence of small production units. They ratio-
nalize this finding with a version of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) with endogenous entry
and productivity investment in which firms’ idiosyncratic distortions, i.e., wedges, are
positively correlated to physical productivity.
Our paper provides additional evidence about the cross-country differences in size
distribution, and emphasize that a poor regulatory environment is behind the excessive
amount of resources allocated to small plants in developing economies. This result
is consistent with the cross-country implications of a recent influential literature that
uses theoretical frameworks to quantitatively measure the aggregate effects of the
3 Mohan (2002) and de Soto (1989) document this phenomenon in India and Peru, respectively. Lewis
(2005) provides evidence of the presence of size-dependent policies for a number of countries.
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presence of distortions.4 This literature shows that the existence of distortions diverts
the economy from its first best. In particular, distortions make too many resources
be allocated to small unproductive firms, generating big output losses. Guner et al.
(2008) show that policies that reduce the average size of establishments by 20% lead
to reductions in output up to around 8%. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find that removing
distortions in India and China such that marginal products are equalized to the extent
observed in the US would imply TFP gains of up to 50% in China and up to 60% in
India. García-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) show that removing a particular size-
dependent policy in India, the Reservation Laws, would imply a TFP gain of 2% in
the Indian manufacturing sector.5
Our paper is also related to recent works that investigate the relationship between
finance and misallocation. The quantitative impact of financial frictions on aggregate
productivity varies across studies, since it depends on the framework used. Erosa and
Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008) show that financial frictions can generate misallocation
of resources both across entrepreneurs of different talent and across industries with
different needs of external financing. Amaral and Quintin (2010) present a model of
occupational choice in which poor enforcement can generate big output losses by
increasing the use of less productive technologies. Buera et al. (2011) calibrate a two
sectors version of Lucas (1978) to the US economy, showing that financial frictions
can generate TFP losses of up to 40%. Caselli and Gennailoli (2013) study a model
in which poor contract enforceability is associated to the prevalence of dynastic-
family firms, which reduces TFP. Moll (2014) shows that, when firms’ productivity
shocks are persistent, TFP steady state losses due to financial frictions are small, since
entrepreneurs can overcome financial constraints by self-financing using their own
wealth. Using Korean plant-level data, Midrigan and Xu (2014) show that most of the
income losses due to financial frictions stem from distortions associated to entry and
technology adoption decisions. In these works, the presence of financial frictions is
often associated to a higher presence of unproductive small entrepreneurs and hence
lower average firm sizes. This relationship is explicitly quantified by Quintin (2008),
who shows that a model of limited enforcement calibrated to the US, by matching the
measures of access to finance of some developing countries, can replicate the observed
differences in average firm size between the US and Argentina andMexico. Our paper
contributes to this literature by presenting cross-country evidence of this relationship.
3 Enterprise surveys of the world bank
The ESWB are a collection of plant-level surveys meant to be representative of a
country’s non-agricultural private formal economy. The goal of these surveys is to
collect information about the business environment and how it affects the performance
of plants across developing countries. The data is collected from business owners and
4 See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) and Hopenhayn (2014) for a detailed description of the state of the
literature on misallocation.
5 In a recent work, García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) emphasize costly bankruptcy procedures
as a potential explanation for the high presence of small firms in Spain. The reason is that these high costs
of declaring bankruptcy make hard for small firms to stop operating and exit the market.
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top managers. They include number of employees, amount of capital employed, sales,
type of ownership, perception of corruption, finance, and obstacles to growth, among
other plant characteristics.
Although the ESWB are compelling from the country coverage point of view, the
number of observations per country is usually small. Typically between 1200 and 1800
establishments are interviewed in large economies, 360 in medium-sized economies
and 150 in small economies. While representative pictures of the aggregates can be
computed by using the provided population weights, the dataset is somehow limited
to construct representative measures at a high disaggregation level. This is why we
take the country-level regressions as our preferred specifications, and carry out some
country-(broadly defined) sector analysis as a robustness exercise.
We use the Standardized Data covering the period 2006 to 2010.6 Our sample
consists of 104 countries, most of them of low and middle income per capita.7 Table
9 in the “Appendix 1” lists the countries included as well as some characteristics of
them. Per capita GDP of percentiles 25, 50 and 75 in our sample are respectively 3,
10 and 24% that of the US.
The ESWB do not cover either informal firms or establishments with less than 5
employees. Both issues go against finding a positive relationship between economic
distortions and more labor in small firms. In a simple regression of the share of labor
in small plants on economic distortions, the coefficient of distortions is biased down-
wards, because informal firms are generally smaller, and they are more prevalent in
countries with higher economic distortions. Despite this issue, we still find a sig-
nificant positive correlation between economic distortions and the amount of labor in
small plants.Moreover, we observe the degree of competition stemming from informal
firms, hence we introduce it as an additional control.
Micro data not targeting firms under a certain size is a common shortcoming in
the literature of size distribution. For instance, Alfaro et al. (2009) truncate the data
in 20 employees, as countries with low coverage in their database are very likely
to over represent older and larger establishments. Also, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
work with Indian plants of more than 10 workers and with non-state Chinese firms of
more than 5 million yuan in revenue. The dataset used by Poschke (2014), the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), includes very small establishments. This survey
targets households instead of firms in order to identify entrepreneurship. Its main
limitations are that coverage is not very wide and that it does not contain information
about large firms. Poschke (2014) overcomes the latter problem by merging GEM
with Amadeus, which provides good coverage of large firms. Table 1 shows the main
characteristics of the datasets used for cross-country analysis of the size distribution.
6 Available at www.enterprisesurveys.org. A Standardized Dataset for the period 2002–2005 is also avail-
able. However, just 35% of the observations have information on weights. Hence, it is not possible to
estimate unbiased population statistics for the majority of countries.
7 The original database covers 128 country-surveys. For those countries with more than one survey, we use
the latest one.
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Table 1 Comparison between datasets on cross-country analysis of size distribution
Paper Name Countries Level of survey Truncation Informal
Alfaro et al. (2009) Dun & Bradstreet 80 Plant It varies No
Poschke (2014) GEM + Amadeus 50 Firm 0 Yes
This paper ESWB 104 Plant 5 No
The main characteristics of different datasets used to perform cross-country analysis of the size distribution
of production units
3.1 External validation of enterprise surveys
Most of our sample is comprised of countrieswith very low levels of income per capita.
This raises a concern regarding the accurateness of the measurement of employment
in our data, as surveys may be less reliable for poorer countries. We address this issue
by performing an external validation of the ESWB data, comparing it to a widely used
aggregate dataset, the Penn World Table 7.0 (PWT), see Heston et al. (2011).
We proceed as follows. For each country in our sample, we estimate the total
number of workers in the sectors targeted by the Enterprise Surveys. The sampling
methodology of the surveys is random sampling with replacement, and weights are
provided for each observation.8 Then, we estimate the total number of workers in
the ESWB by multiplying the number of employees of each plant by the associated
weight (see Table 10 in the “Appendix 2” for a definition of all variables used in
the paper). Then, we compare this number with the total number of workers in the
country reported by the PWT. Panel A of Fig. 2 shows that there is a high cross-country
correlation between both estimates (0.69), suggesting a fair degree of accurateness of
the Enterprise Surveys data.
Nevertheless, we still find some dispersion between the number of workers com-
puted from both data sources, and this dispersion widens in countries with a lower
number of workers. The ESWB do not target all economic sectors, such as for instance
agriculture. On the contrary, PWT takes into account overall employment (including
agriculture). For this reason, we do a second exercise consisting on regressing the log
number of workers provided by the PWT against the log number of workers estimated
from the ESWB, adding the share of employment in agriculture as a control. Panel B
of Fig. 2 shows the partial correlation (net of employment in agriculture) of the num-
ber of workers in the ESWB and the PWT. The dispersion is significantly reduced.
There are a few countries that depart from the straight line, though. For the sake of
transparency, we decided not to drop them from our analysis. Nevertheless, as shown
later, excluding them makes the results stronger.9 Overall, this comparison speaks in
favor of the quality of employment data of the Enterprise Surveys.
8 Strata are based on establishment size, business sector and geographic region within a country. The
ESWB exert a lot of effort in order to identify the universe of eligible firms, which is crucial to construct
reliable weights. This is obtained from the country’s government agencies, private business associations
and marketing databases.
9 These outliers are Nigeria (NGA), Lesotho (LSO), Angola (AGO), Samoa (WSM) and Tonga (TON).
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Fig. 2 Correlation between ESWB and PWT. The correlation between the number of workers computed
from the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank (ESWB) and those reported by the Penn World Table 7.0
(PWT). a displays the raw correlation. b shows the correlation controlling for the size of the agricultural
sector
4 Size distribution of plants and productivity at the aggregate level
In this section, we provide evidence of a cross-country negative relationship between
aggregate productivity and a size distribution of plants skewed towards small estab-
lishments. Our aim is to show that the plants’ size distribution is an important object
for understanding the variation in aggregate productivity. This motivates the analy-
sis of the next section, in which we explore the determinants of the cross-country
heterogeneity in the amount of labor employed in small plants.10
We consider twomeasures of aggregate productivity: TFP—computed as in Caselli
(2005)—and labor productivity—GDP per worker.11 We explore the relationship
between aggregate productivity and two statistics of the size distribution: the aver-
age plant size and the share of employment accounted by plants of different size.
We start our analysis by looking at the cross-country relationship between aver-
age plant size and aggregate productivity. We classify countries in different groups
according to their aggregate productivity. For TFP, we split countries in two groups
(below and above the median) and for GDP per worker we consider three groups of
the same size. We then compare the mean across countries of the average plant size
between the different categories of aggregate productivity.12
We find that plants are on average considerably larger in countries with a level of
TFP above the median, see Panel A of Table 2. In particular, we find that the average
10 In “Appendix 3” we analyze the relationship between size and productivity at the micro level. The
results are in line with a broad literature that have documented the positive association between firm size
and productivity, see, for instance, Leung et al. (2008), Bernard et al. (2003), Van Ark and Monnikhof
(1996), and Little (1987).
11 Our measure of TFP is: TFP = y
k1/3h2/3
where y = real GDP per worker in international dollars
(PWT 6.1); k = capital-labor ratio (PWT 6.1) and h = average human capital computed using Barro and
Lee (2001).
12 There are 47 countries in ESWBwith data on TFP and 99 with data on GDP per worker. The 5 countries
without data on GDP per worker are assigned to a group according to their level of income per capita using
the classification of the World Bank.
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Table 2 Average log establishment size and aggregate productivity














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2.79 3.11 0.0033 2.72 2.92 2.96 0.0070
(0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.36) (0.36)
The mean across countries of the average log size of establishments for different levels of aggregate pro-
ductivity relative to the US. Panel A uses TFP -estimated as in Caselli (2005)—and Panel B uses GDP
per Worker. The 47 countries in the ESWB with data on TFP are divided in two groups: below and above
median TFP. The 99 countries in our sample with data on GDP per worker are classified in three groups of
the same size: low, medium and high labor productivity. 5 countries without data on GDP per worker are
assigned to a group according to their level of income per capita using the classification of the World Bank.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Columns (3) and (7) displays the P values of a one-side test with
null hypothesis being that the average of the low group is lower than the high group, allowing for unequal
variances
plant size in countries with a high level of TFP is around 30% higher than in countries
with low TFP. The same pattern is found in Panel B, where we compare countries
across different levels of labor productivity. We observe a monotonic positive cross-
country relationship between the average plant size and the level of GDP perworker. In
particular, the average plant size in countries with medium and high labor productivity
is around 25 percent higher than in countries with low labor productivity, being these
differences statistically significant.
Next, we compute for each country the amount of labor allocated to plants of
different size. In particular, we calculate the share of labor allocated to small (less
than 20 employees) and large plants (100 or more employees). That is, we compute:
Ssc =
∑Nc










where Ssc and S
l
c are the shares of employment allocated to small and large plants in
country c, respectively; i denotes an establishment, and Nc is the number of estab-
lishments surveyed in country c. Li is the number of employees and ωi corresponds
to the weight associated to establishment i .
Panel A of Table 3 shows that countries with lower levels of TFP allocate more
employment to small plants. In particular, we observe that, on average, countries with
TFP below the median allocate 17% of employment in small establishments, whereas
in countries with TFP above the median, this share is just 9%. Not surprisingly, this
pattern is reversedwhen looking at the percentage of workers employed in large plants.
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Table 3 Share of employment accounted by small and large plants across countries classified by aggregate
productivity
Panel A: Total factor productivity
Small plants Large plants
Low TFP High TFP Low TFP High TFP
0.17 0.09 0.58 0.71
(0.11) (0.05) (0.19) (0.13)
Panel B: Labor productivity















0.20 0.15 0.14 0.54 0.56 0.61
(0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19)
The average share of employment accounted by small and large establishments across countries according
to their level of TFP (Panel A) and labor productivity (Panel B). TFP is computed as in Caselli (2005).
Labor productivity is calculated as GDP per worker. The 47 countries in our sample with data on TFP are
divided in two groups according to their TFP below or above the median (low and high). The 99 countries
in our sample with data on GDP per Worker are divided in three groups of the same size according to their
GDP per worker (low, medium and high). The 5 countries without data on GDP per Worker are assigned
to a group according to their level of income per capita, using the World Bank classification. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis
In countries with high TFP, 70% of employment is accounted by large establishments,
whereas this figure is just 58% in countries with low TFP.13
The same picture emerges when we use GDP per worker as a measure of produc-
tivity. Panel B of Table 3 shows that countries with low GDP per worker allocate on
average 20 percent of employment to small plants, whereas countries with high GDP
per worker allocate just 14%. The opposite result arises when we look at large plants.
These account for more than 60% of total employment in counties with high GDP per
worker and only 54 percent in countries with low GDP per worker.14
In Fig. 3we show the linear correlation between the share of employment accounted
by small plants and aggregate productivity (TFP in Panel A and GDP per worker in
Panel B). A one standard deviation increase in the share of employment accounted
by small plants is associated to a .35 decrease in TFP and a .23 decrease in GDP per
worker. These relationships are statistically significant in both cases. Specifically, both
linear equations look as follows:
13 These differences in the size distribution between countries of low and high TFP are statistically signif-
icant under a one-side T test of difference of means. P values are .0018 and .0034 for differences in labor
accounted by small and large plants, respectively.
14 Again, these differences are statistically significant under a one-side T test of difference of means. P
values are .0238 and .0665 for the differences in labor allocated to small and large plants, respectively.
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correlation = .16
Fig. 3 Employment distribution and aggregate productivity. a Shows the cross-country linear correlation
between the share of employment accounted by small/large plants and TFP (computed as in Caselli (2005)).
b Shows the cross-country linear correlation between the share of employment accounted by small/large
plants and labor productivity (computed as GDP per worker)
TFPc = .5833 − .7907 ∗ Ssc
(.0526) (.2237) (3)
GDP per workerc = .2085 − .2822 ∗ Ssc
(.0262) (.1251) (4)
This negative cross-country association between productivity and the share of
employment allocated to small plants is consistent with previous works. There is
a large literature that shows that low income countries tend to allocate more employ-
ment to small production units, see Tybout (2000). Using recent data, Poschke (2014)
documents a positive correlation between firms’ average employment and per capita
GDP, a fact that is also present in our data.15 Given the strong positive cross-country
association between income per capita and productivity, it is then expected productiv-
ity and the share of employment allocated to small plants to be negatively correlated.
15 This finding contrasts with Alfaro et al. (2009), who uncover the opposite result. Most likely, the reason
for such disparity lays in the sample of countries considered. Our sample is comprised mostly of developing
countries, with average per capita GDP being 14% that of the US. In Alfaro et al. (2009) the sample
considered includes 24 OECD member countries (out of 79 countries) and average per capita GDP is 32%
that of the US, more than twice as much as in our sample. Moreover, Alfaro et al. (2009) truncate the
distribution of employment below 20 employees.
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In the next section, we emphasize that economic distortions can significantly explain
why some countries allocate more resources to small plants.
5 Size distribution and distortions
In this section, we provide evidence on the relevance of economic distortions in
explaining the cross-country variation in the plants’ size distribution. We perform
OLS regressions of the share of employment accounted by small plants (which in our
specification summarizes the size distribution of a country) on economic distortions
and several controls.
We start with the Ease of Doing Business Index as a proxy for economic distortions.
This index provides objectivemeasures of the business regulations that local firms face,
covering a wide range of topics such as entry costs, government bureaucracy, financial
conditions, taxes, contract enforcement, etc. One main advantage of this index is that
it covers many countries in the developing world, for which statistics are usually hard
to obtain. Also, it is based mostly on quantitative measures, hence cross-country com-
parisons are more meaningful. In its original form, the index is a ranking of economies
from best to worst business environment, ranging in our sample from 13 to 183 (the
country with lowest economic distortions and the country with highest, respectively,
see “Appendix” Table 9). We normalize it so that a higher value of the index means
a better business environment and to have unit standard deviation in order to ease the
interpretation of the coefficients. Later on we focus on the specific distortions that
potentially underlie the results that we find on the overall business environment.
Certainly, there are many additional factors beyond the business environment that
affect the size distribution of plants across countries. These factors generate inconsis-
tent estimates of the causal relationship of local distortions on the size distribution,
as long as they simultaneously affect the business environment and the size distribu-
tion through a channel independent from the business environment. This is probably
the case, as the regulatory environment of a country is the result of numerous discre-
tionary decisions, complex economic forces, and natural conditions, which very likely
have an additional independent effect on the size distribution. For instance, foreign
and export firms are on average larger than domestic firms, see for instance Bernard
et al. (2007), Eaton et al. (2011) and García-Santana (2014), and the presence of these
type of firms is probably explained by factors that go beyond the prevailing regula-
tory conditions (e.g. entrepreneurship, cultural and political distance to rich countries,
comparative advantage in tradable sectors, etc.). As controlling for all these factors is
difficult (some of them are unobservable), causal effects of the business environment
on the size distribution in this cross-country framework are hard to pursue and we
favor a prudent predictive interpretation of our results. Anyhow, to somewhat attenu-
ate this endogeneity concerns and to provide with an specification able to explain as
much as possible of the variation in the size distribution across countries, we include
several variables aimed at controlling for these factors and run instrumental variables
regressions to check the robustness of the results.
Our set of controls include the presence of informal, export and foreign firms, size
of the country and human capital. Our choice of controls is based on economic theory
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and the availability of data. The latter allows us to estimate different specifications
on a stable sample, which guarantees transparency and eases the interpretation of the
results. Accounting for informality allows us to solve a negative bias on the coefficient
of economic distortions, as countries with a worse business environment have more
informal firms and these tend to be very small. As formerly stated, export and foreign
firms are larger on average that firms selling only to the domesticmarket, thus including
these controls prevents a positive bias on the coefficient we are interested in. Also,
a higher human capital is positively associated with firms of larger size, certainly by
means that go beyond its effect on economic regulations (through technology adoption,
for instance). Finally, the size of the countrymight affect both the optimal size of plants
and the emergence of institutions that shape the business environment.
Our OLS regressions take the following form:
Ssc = β0 + β1Distortionsc + β2Informalityc + β3Log Populationc
+β4 %Foreign Firmsc + β5 %Export Firmsc + β6Human Capitalc + uc
(5)
where the dependent variable, Ssc , is the share of employment allocated to small plants
in country c, as computed in Eq. (1). The level of distortions is captured by the Doing
Business Index and that of informality by the percentage of plants that report that
competition from informal firms is a major or severe obstacle to growth. Additional
controls include the percentage of foreign and export firms, as well as the average
number of years of experience of managers in the country, which proxies for human
capital and managerial talent. See Table 10 in the “Appendix 2” for further details on
these variables.
The results of the estimation of Eq. (5) are shown in Table 4. In column (1) we show
that countries with a better business environment have on average a significant lower
share of labor allocated to small plants. A one standard deviation improvement in the
business environment is associated to a 3.0% points decrease in the share of labor
allocated to small plants. This is 0.24 standard deviations of the dependent variable.
Column (2) adds informality as an additional covariate. As expected, the coefficient on
the business environment goes down to 3.7%points. This coefficient increases to 2.9%
when we add a full set of controls—column (3)—, but it remains quantitatively large
and statistically significant at 1 percent. The point estimate indicates that, conditional
on the controls, a country improving its business environment from theworst to the best
value in our sample is associated to 10.4 percentage points less labor allocated to small
plants. According to Eq. (3), this means an improvement of TFP relative to the US of
8.2% points. The controls have the expected signs and most of them are statistically
significant. Countries with more export and foreign firms as well as managers with
more experience allocate less labor to small plants. Also, bigger countries assign
more resources to larger firms. The specification of column (3) accounts for 42% of
the variation in the size distribution across countries.
In column (4) we explore the sensitivity of these results to dropping those countries
that did not pass the validation exercise carried out in Sect. 3.1. These countries are
suspicious of having a survey that is less representative of the population of plants.
When we exclude them from the regression, our coefficient associated to the business
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environment becomes quantitatively larger. A country going from the highest to the
lowest economic distortions would be associated to 12.4% points less labor allocated
to small plants and 9.8 percentage points higher TFP relative to the US.16 In Fig. 4 we
show the correlation of each covariate and the dependent variable once the effect of
the rest of the covariates are controlled for (partial correlations). It is reassuring that no
outliers drive the results, specially on the relationship between economic distortions
and the size distribution.
In columns (5) and (6)we address the issue of endogeneity that ariseswhen studying
the relationship between economic distortions and the size distribution.We instrument
theDoing Business Indexwith variables that in the literature have been argued to cause
exogenous variation in institutions. Specifically, we use the instruments proposed by
Hall and Jones (1999) in column (5) and by Acemoglu et al. (2001) in column (6).17
The instruments by Hall and Jones (1999) are based on the extent ofWestern European
influence around theworld, which correlateswith geographic characteristics of a coun-
try as well as language. Specifically, the instruments are distance from the equator,
the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe (English, French, Ger-
man, Portuguese, and Spanish) are spoken as first languages today, and the predicted
trade share based on a gravity model of international trade, constructed by Frankel
and Romer (1999).18 The instrument proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is based on
a theory of institutional differences among countries colonized by Europeans. Their
proposal is to use European mortality rates during the period of colonization as an
exogenous variation in institutions.19 We find that the coefficient on the Doing Busi-
ness Index decreases to 6.8% when we use the instruments of Hall and Jones (1999),
roughly twice as low as the OLS estimates, see column (5) of Table 4. When we use
as instrument the one proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001), the effect of economic
distortions in even higher and bears the expected sign, although it is less precisely
estimated (P value is .11). Probably, this is due to the significant drop in the number
16 We also tried including alternative controls with high data availability such as log area, internal distance,
openness, foreign direct investment and education of labor force, and obtained similar results.
17 A similar IV strategy is used by Barseghyan (2008), who studies the cross-country relationship between
entry costs and TFP. He finds big effects: an increase of half a standard deviation in entry costs is associated
to a 22% lower TFP.
18 It is argued that Western influence leads to better institutions today, for instance through the ideas of
Adam Smith, the importance of property rights, etc. The positive correlation between European languages
and Western influence seems reasonable. Distance to the equator is argued to be correlated with Western
influence for two reasons. First, Western Europeans were more likely to migrate and settle in regions of the
world that were sparsely populated, which are those far from the equator. And second, they were more likely
to migrate to regions with similar climate, which again points to regions far from the equator. Regarding
the exclusion restriction, it can be argued that Europeans did not systematically conquer areas of the world
that today exhibit better economic outcomes. See Hall and Jones (1999) for a more detailed explanation.
19 This theory rests on three premises. First, there were different types of colonization policies which cre-
ated different set of institutions, ranging from “extractive states” (extractive institutions) to “Neo-Europes”
(replications of European institutions). Second, the colonization strategy was influenced by the feasibil-
ity of settlements: places with unfavorable disease environments were more likely to develop extractive
institutions. And third, the colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence. The exclusion
restriction implies that, conditional on controls, the mortality rates of European settlers have no effect on
the size distribution today.
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coef = -.00590422, (robust) se = .00228605, t = -2.58
Fig. 4 Partial correlations
of observations. Hence, the IV estimates reinforce the result that there is a significant
relationship between economic distortions and labor allocated to small plants.20
5.1 Robustness: sectoral decomposition of size distribution
In this section we address the issue of the sectoral composition of activity. Countries
specialize in different sectors, and firms in different sectors are of different size. Then,
20 Nevertheless, we raise a flag on interpreting the IV estimates at face value, as the samples are not strictly
comparable due to the decay in the number of observations.
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Table 5 Size distribution of
plants across sectors
The mean across countries and
sectors of statistics of the size
distribution of plants. Column
(1) shows the mean average log
establishment size. Columns (2)
and (3) display the average
across countries of the share of
employment accounted by small
and large firms, respectively.
Standard deviations are in
parenthesis
Average log Share of labor accounted by
Plant size Small plants Large plants
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing 3.17 0.12 0.60
(0.48) (0.12) (0.22)
Construction 3.44 0.13 0.53
(0.67) (0.19) (0.30)
Services 2.82 0.23 0.44
(0.43) (0.17) (0.26)
Trade 2.58 0.29 0.41
(0.38) (0.21) (0.27)
if there exists a correlation between economic distortions and the sectoral composition
of activity, the results of the previous section might be contaminated (for example if
firms in the manufacturing sector are relatively larger, and distortions are associated
to a lower share of manufacturing in overall activity).
Table 5 shows statistics of the size distribution of plants across sectors. We consider
four sectors: manufacturing, construction, trade and services. Column (1) shows that
there are big differences in average plant size across sectors. Scales of production
are much larger in manufacturing and construction than in trade and services. For
instance, average size in manufacturing is almost 60 log points higher than in trade.
These differences are also observed in the amount of labor allocated to plants of
different size. Manufacturing and construction have a lower amount of labor working
in small plants as compared to services and trade.21 This suggests that the sectoral
composition of activity is a relevant issue in explaining the aggregate allocation of
labor across countries.
Then, to control for the sectoral composition of activity and check the robustness of
our previous results, we compute the share of employment accounted by small plants
at the country-sector level, and run the following regression:
Sscj = β0 + β1Distortionsc + β2Informalitycj
+β3Log Populationc + β4 %Foreign Firmscj
+β5 %Export Firmscj + β6Human Capitalcj +
∑
j
γ j + ucj (6)
where Sscj is the share of employment allocated to small plants in sector j of country c
and the rest of the covariates are those of Eq. (5), having variation at the country-sector
level when data are available. γ j are sector dummies corresponding to manufacturing,
21 These differences in the size distribution across sectors are statistically significant under a T test of
equality of means. The only differences not statistically significant are the share of employment accounted
by small plants between manufacturing and construction and that accounted by large plants between trade
and services.
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Table 6 Relationship between economic distortions and size distribution: country-sector regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: share of employment in small firms
Doing Business −0.0347∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0356∗∗∗ −0.0407∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0114)
Informality −0.1478∗ −0.1072 −0.1548∗∗
(0.0826) (0.0747) (0.0610)
Log Population −0.0366∗∗∗ −0.0294∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0062)
% Foreign Firms −0.3402∗∗∗ −0.2688∗∗∗
(0.0824) (0.0598)
% Export Firms −0.1379∗ −0.0956∗
(0.0709) (0.0546)
Avg. Experience of Managers −0.0082∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0022)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 415 415 414 394
R-squared 0.17 0.20 0.33 0.35
The regressions of the share of employment accounted by small firms at the country-sector level on economic
distortions, captured by the Doing Business Index, and several covariates. A higher value of the indexmeans
lower economic distortions. Column (1) includes the Doing Business Index as the only covariate. Column
(2) adds informality at the country-sector level as a control. Column (3) adds additional controls. Column (4)
excludes those countries suspicious of not having a World Bank survey representative of the population of
plants, as documented in Sect. 3.1. These are Angola, Lesotho, Nigeria, Samoa and Tonga. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis, clustered at the country level. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%
construction, services and trade. The inclusion of sector dummies control for techno-
logical characteristics of each sector that affect the scale of production and hence the
distribution of employment.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating Eq. (6). The results are very similar to those
found in the cross-country counterpart regressions of Table 4. In column (1)we observe
that countries with a better business environment are associated to a lower amount of
labor allocated to small firms, at the country-sector level. This relationship is higher
whenwe add informality as a control—column (2)—and remains of similarmagnitude
when we add several covariates—column (3). Finally, excluding those countries for
which the quality of data might be compromised increases the relationship found.
Quantitatively, the point estimates of these country-sector regressions are of similar
magnitude as those found in the cross-country regressions of Table 4.
6 A look on particular distortions
In the previous section, we analyzed the relationship between economic distortions
(captured by the Doing Business Index) and the share of employment allocated to
small plants. As mentioned above, the Doing Business Index is a composite index
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that accounts for several features of the business environment. In this section, we
look at particular distortions in order to shed light on the specific policies that drove
the previous results. In particular, we focus on access to finance, taxes, cost of entry,
easiness of exporting, rule of law, and corruption.
We capture the availability of financial credit by computing from our micro data
the percentage of firms in each country that have neither a line of credit nor a loan,
and report to be in need of capital. As mentioned in Sect. 2, many works emphasize
the importance of financial frictions in explaining the cross-country different levels of
aggregate productivity. The mechanism through which financial frictions can generate
misallocation and hence TFP losses is straightforward. Suppose that there are poor
and rich individuals, and both rich and poor can be talented or untalented. In a context
of lack of full contract enforcement, poor talented people will not even operate or
will do at a too small scale. They will not be able to capture enough resources from
financial markets to achieve their optimal size. On the other hand, rich entrepreneurs
will be able to finance themselves using their own resources. Then, if the correlation
between wealth and talent is not one, misallocation of entrepreneurial talent, labor,
and capital arises in equilibrium. In these kind of situations, the aggregate demand for
labor and hence equilibrium wages are inefficiently low, implying a too low average
plant size and a too high amount of resources allocated to small plants.
The quantitative effect of taxation in a context of heterogeneous producers has also
been studied in the literature, as in, for instance, Guner et al. (2008). Government
policies that promote the existence of small less productive firms by levying taxes on
large ones can generate big TFP and output losses. This is so as taxing large firms
makes the aggregate demand for labor as well as the equilibrium wage be inefficiently
low. In such a situation, unproductive entrepreneurs can afford to operate, biasing the
size distribution of plants towards small production units. We measure taxes as the
percentage of commercial profits taxed by the public administration.
Our proxy for the cost of entry is the cost of business start-up procedures as a
percentage of gross national income per capita. As noted by de Soto (1989), barriers to
entry aim at protecting current producers. Taking advantage of the lack of competition,
these producers are able to extract rents. As insiders, small unproductive firms prevent
the entry of productive and potentially large ones. If productive firms cannot enter,
wages remain low, allowing small unproductive producers to keep operating.22
A large recent literature has documented the fact that export firms are bigger and
more productive than domestic firms, see, for instance, Clerides et al. (1998), Aw et al.
(2000) and Bernard et al. (2007). Therefore, policies aimed at facilitating the process
of exporting and importing have the potential to shape the size distribution towards
big firms. The mechanism is twofold. On the one hand, a reduction in trade costs
provides larger business opportunities for the most productive plants, which are able
22 Recent papers have emphasized the importance of entry costs in explaining differences in income levels
and growth. Barseghyan andDiCecio (2001) andHerrendorf andTeixeira (2011) quantify the effects of entry
costs on aggregate TFP and income in developing countries. Nicoletti et al. (2003) show that differences in
the regulation of entry explain the productivity growth divergence between continental Europe and the US
during the 1980s and the 1990s. Asturias et al. (2012) study the effect of the interaction between financial
frictions and entry barriers on growth.
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to grow, as in Melitz (2003). On the other hand, as shown by De Loecker (2013), by
serving foreign markets, firms are able to learn better technologies and improve their
productivity. We use approximate the easiness of conducting businesses with foreign
agents with an index that computes the procedural requirements for exporting and
importing a standardized cargo of goods.
Finally, we also explore the relationship between the size distribution and the pro-
tection of property rights in a country (rule of law) as well as corruption. These
components of the economic environment may act as constraints on firms’ growth,
see, for instance, Svensson (2003).
Table 7 shows the relationship between these features of the business environment
and the amount of labor allocated to small plants. The regressions are the same as in
Eq. (5), except that we substitute theDoingBusiness Index by the particular distortions
mentioned above. We find that, when included separately, access to finance and entry
costs play a significant role in explaining the share of employment accounted by small
plants, as shown in columns (1) and (3). On the contrary, lower taxes, a better rule of
law, lower international trade costs, and a better control of corruption do not appear to
be significantly related to a lower amount of resources in small plants, although they
bear the expected signs.
In column (1) of Table 8 we include all these features of the business environment
simultaneously. It turns out that only financial constraints have significant explanatory
power in accounting for the cross-country variation in the amount of labor employed by
small plants. Conditional on the rest of covariates, a one standard deviation reduction in
the financial constraints faced by local firms (meaning that the percentage of financially
constrained firms is reduced in 19.6% points) is associated to a 3.5% points decrease
in the share of labor allocated to small firms. This translates into a 2.8 percentage points
TFP gain, according to Eq. (3) In the following specifications we check the robustness
of this result. In column (2) we exclude those countries for which the quality of the
data might be compromised, according to Sect. 3.1, and find that the coefficient of
financial constraints increases its magnitude and is significant at 1%. In columns (3)
to (5) we add different proxies for access to credit. In column (3) we include the
Getting Credit Index, which measures the strength of legal rights, the depth of credit
information, and both the public and private coverage of credit histories of individuals.
In column (4) we add the percentage of firms using banks to finance investment, and
in column (5) the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP. All these
variables enter significantly in the regressions: the better are the financial conditions
of a country, the lower is the share of employment accounted by small plants. Finally,
in column (6) we instrument the financial constraints with the instruments of Hall and
Jones (1999). The results show that the estimated effect is even larger than the OLS
estimate: a one standard deviation improvement in financial conditions is associated
to a 6.8 percentage points decrease in the amount of labor employed by small firms,
and a TFP gain of 5.4% points relative to the US.23
23 The instrumental variables regressions of the alternative proxies of financial constraints yield qualita-
tively similar results.
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Table 7 Factors of the business environment and size distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



















Informality −0.0740 −0.0212 −0.0472 −0.0037 0.0041 −0.0053
(0.0668) (0.0670) (0.0666) (0.0702) (0.0679) (0.0677)
Log Population −0.0441∗∗∗ −0.0448∗∗∗ −0.0425∗∗∗ −0.0430∗∗∗ −0.0421∗∗∗ −0.0429∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0111)
% Foreign Firms −0.4384∗∗∗ −0.4353∗∗∗ −0.4889∗∗∗ −0.4542∗∗∗ −0.4632∗∗∗ −0.4509∗∗∗
(0.1259) (0.1300) (0.1450) (0.1336) (0.1298) (0.1275)
% Export Firms −0.1713∗∗ −0.2190∗∗∗ −0.1595∗∗ −0.1988∗∗∗ −0.2078∗∗∗ −0.1996∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0738) (0.0795) (0.0750) (0.0768) (0.0719)
Avg. Experience
of Managers
−0.0031 −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Constant 0.6245∗∗∗ 0.6893∗∗∗ 0.6765∗∗∗ 0.7437∗∗∗ 0.7509∗∗∗ 0.7395∗∗∗
(0.1276) (0.1446) (0.1288) (0.1265) (0.1186) (0.1225)
Observations 103 103 103 103 104 103
R-squared 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.37
The regressions of the share of employment accounted by small firms on several components of the business
environment: financial constraints—column (1); taxes—-column (2); cost of entry—column (3); rule of
law—column (4); trade easiness—column (5); and corruption—column (6). Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *10 %; **5 %; ***1 %
7 Conclusions
In this paper we show cross-country empirical evidence of the relationship between
aggregate productivity, plants’ size distribution, and economic distortions. Consistent
with the recent literature on misallocation, we show that countries that allocate more
resources to small plants are associated to lower levels of aggregate productivity, and
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Table 8 Factors of the business environment and size distribution: robustness
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)































Informality −0.0869 −0.0942 −0.0634 −0.0991 −0.0635 −0.1278∗
(0.0674) (0.0602) (0.0625) (0.0661) (0.0639) (0.0776)
Log Population −0.0437∗∗∗ −0.0364∗∗∗ −0.0324∗∗∗ −0.0404∗∗∗ −0.0367∗∗∗ −0.0357∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0066)
% Foreign Firms −0.4492∗∗∗ −0.3151∗∗∗ −0.3136∗∗∗ −0.4129∗∗∗ −0.3739∗∗∗ −0.2977∗∗∗
(0.1157) (0.1043) (0.1090) (0.1305) (0.1117) (0.0986)
% Export Firms −0.1670∗∗ −0.1381∗ −0.2004∗ −0.2614∗ −0.1357∗ −0.1190∗
(0.0814) (0.0726) (0.1146) (0.1336) (0.0777) (0.0693)
Avg. Experience
of Managers
−0.0053 −0.0021 −0.0057∗∗ 0.0033 −0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0049)
Constant 0.6150∗∗∗ 0.5274∗∗∗ 0.6688∗∗∗ 0.6535∗∗∗ 0.7171∗∗∗ 0.4668∗∗∗
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Table 8 continued
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.1024) (0.0785) (0.0760) (0.0882) (0.0790) (0.1245)
Observations 100 98 92 77 94 69
R-squared 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.38
The regressions of the share of employment accounted by small firms on several components of the business
environment.Column (1) adds all features of the business environment simultaneously.Column (2) adds only
the baseline measure of financial constraints and excludes those countries suspicious of not having a World
Bank survey representative of population of plants as documented in Sect. 3.1: Angola, Lesotho, Nigeria,
Samoa and Tonga. Columns (3) to (5) include alternative measures of financial constraints. Column (6)
instruments themeasure of financial constraints of column (1)with distance from the equator, the percentage
of the population speaking the main European languages, and the predicted trade share constructed from a
gravity model, see Hall and Jones (1999). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗:
10 %; ∗∗: 5 %; ∗∗∗: 1 %
that economic distortions can partly explain this excessive allocation of resources
to small production units. After decomposing the set of economic distortions, we
conclude that distortions related to the capacity of the economy to provide credit are
the main driver of our results.
Our findings open the door to further investigate the specific mechanisms through
which distortions affect the size distribution of firms. One of the main issues that
are worth exploring is how the business environment affects the life cycle of plants.
Looking at cross-country differences on how plants enter, grow, and exit would shed
more light on the specific mechanisms through which economic distortions affect the
allocation of resources and hence aggregate productivity. A recent work that looks at
differences in the life cycle of plants across countries is Hsieh and Klenow (2014).
They find that, whereas in the US surviving plants grow dramatically over time, this
growth is much more moderate in Mexico and almost non-existent in India. We view
the study of these plants’ life cycle differences across countries as a promising avenue
for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix 1: Countries included in dataset
See Table 9.
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Appendix 2: Data: definitions and sources
See Table 10.





ESWB Permanent (l1) + Temporary (l6) employees in last fiscal year
Small
Establishment
ESWB Establishment of less than 20 employees
Medium
Establishment
ESWB Establishment between 20 and 99 employees
Large
Establishment
ESWB Establishment of 100 or more employees
Value Added per
Worker
ESWB Sales (d2)−Cost of Raw Materials (n2e)−Cost of Electricity (n2b)Number of Employees
Age ESWB Age of the Establishment (b5)
Foreign
Ownership
ESWB 50%ormore of the firm is owned by private foreign individuals,
companies or organizations (b2b)
Export Status ESWB Establishment sells part of its output abroad (d3b,d3c)
Capital Labor
Ratio
ESWB Machinery, Vehicles and Equipment (n6a)+Land and Buildings (n6b)Number of Employees
Sector ESWB Two-Digit ISIC (Rev 3.1)
Manufacturing ESWB ISIC (Rev. 3.1) between 15 and 37
Construction ESWB ISIC (Rev. 3.1) 45
Services ESWB ISIC (Rev. 3.1) 40, 41 and between 55 and 95
Trade ESWB ISIC (Rev. 3.1) 50, 51 and 52
Per Capita GDP World Bank Per Capita GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) rel-
ative to the US
Employment in
Agriculture




Caselli (2005) See footnote 14
Number of
Workers
PWT 7.0 PPP Converted GDP Per CapitaPPP Converted GDP Chain per worker Population
GDP per Worker PWT 7.0 Real GDP per worker with respect to the US
Doing Business
Index
World Bank Index of the quality of the business regulations facing local
firms. We normalize it so a higher value of the index means a
better business environment and to have unit standard deviation
Informality ESWB Percentage of firms for which competition of informal firms is
a major or severe obstacle to growth (e30)
Log Population PWT 7.0 Log Population
% Foreign Firms ESWB % of firms at least 50% owned by private foreign individuals,
companies or organizations
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Table 10 continued
Variable Source Definition
% Export Firms ESWB % of firms that directly export a positive amount
Avg. Experience
of Managers
ESWB Average years of experience working in the sector of top man-
agers in a country
Financial
Constraints
ESWB % of firms that have neither a line of credit nor a loan and report
to be in need of capital
Log Tax Rate World Bank Log total tax rate (% of commercial profits)
Log Cost of
Entry
World Bank Log cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita)
Rule of Law Worldwide
Governance
Indicators
Quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the
courts and likelihood of crime and violence
Trading
Easiness
World Bank Index of the procedural requirements for exporting and import-
ing a standardized cargo of goods. We normalize it so a higher







Index of perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms




World Bank Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders and sharing of
credit information. We normalize it so a higher value of the








World Bank Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
Definitions and sources of all variables used throughout the paper. When the source is the Enterprise
Surveys of the World Bank (ESWB) the codes in parenthesis in the definition correspond to the code of the
Questionnaire of the ESWB
Appendix 3: Size and productivity at the plant-level
In this section we analyze the relationship between size and productivity at the micro
level in our dataset.We compare the productivity of plants of different size, controlling
for country, sector, and several determinants of the efficiency of plants. Specifically,
we control for the age of the plant, export status, foreign ownership status and capital-
labor ratio. These characteristics are likely to be associated with both higher levels of
productivity and a larger firm size.
Our measure of size is the number of permanent plus temporary employees
employed by the plant. We define three types of plants according to its size: small
plants are those with less than 20 employees, medium establishments are those with
a number of workers between 20 and 99, and large establishments are those with 100
or more employees. We also consider a continuous measure of size, defined as the log
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number of employees. Productivity is computed as valued added per worker. Value
added is defined as the cost of raw materials and electricity subtracted from revenue.




= γ0 + γ1Sizei + γ2log Agei + γ3Foreigni













is valued added per worker of plant i in sector j and country c; Size can
be either whether plant i is small, medium or large, or the log number of employees;
logAge is the log number of years during which plant i has been operating; Foreign is
a dummy taking value one in plant i is foreign owned; Export takes value one if plant
i exports and zero otherwise; and KiLi is plant i’s capital labor ratio. Sector (2-digit
ISIC) and country dummies are also included in all specifications. Observations are
weighted according to the stratified random sampling procedure of the ESWB.
Table 11 shows the results of estimating Eq. (7). Column (1) shows that, within
countries and sectors, large establishments are, on average, 97 percentmore productive
than small plants, which is the excluded category. This difference is highly statistically
significant and quantitatively large. In column (2), when conditioning on plant charac-
teristics, the difference decreases to 86%. Interestingly, export and foreign plants have
a higher labor productivity conditional on size. In column (3) we include an additional
firm characteristic, the capital labor ratio, in order to control for substitution between
production inputs. This tackles the concern that small plants might have less labor
productivity because they use intensively less capital. We find that, conditional on the
capital-labor ratio, large firms exhibit a significant higher labor productivity, of 72%
on average. In columns (4) to (6) we use a continuous measure of size: log number of
employees. The same qualitative result arises: larger establishments are significantly
more productive than small plants, even when conditioning in plant characteristics. A
10% increase in the number of employees is associated to a increase in labor produc-
tivity of between 2 and 3 percent, depending on the specification.
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